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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2815
___________
WENG QING FEN,
                                    Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                                Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A99-540-000
(U.S. Immigration Judge: Rosalind K. Malloy)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 26, 2009
Before: Chief Judge SCIRICA, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  August 31, 2009  )
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM.
Weng Qing Fen, a twenty-one-year old native and citizen of the People’s Republic
of China, petitions for review of a final order of removal entered by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.  
2Fen unlawfully entered the United States in 2006, conceded his removability in
proceedings before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), and applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Fen asserted that he
suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution on the basis of
his involvement in China with an unregistered Christian church.
Fen testified before the IJ that he began regularly attending the church with his
mother in July 2004, at age sixteen.  The police purportedly arrested Fen and his mother
at a church meeting on December 31, 2004, and pressured Fen to divulge the names of
church attendees who had evaded arrest.  Fen claimed that he refused to provide any
names, was detained for a week, and was mistreated during his detention, including being
hit in the face.  Fen also testified that the police forced him to sign a letter promising that
he would cease attending the church.  Fen’s mother was detained for one month.  
Fen allegedly was arrested a second time, on March 13, 2005, this time at the home
of the church pastor, with the police detaining Fen for two weeks before transferring him
to a juvenile labor camp, where he was held for one month.  Fen claimed that he was
forced to perform menial labor, made to attend “brainwashing sessions,” and occasionally
beaten.  Although his parents and brother remain in China, Fen arranged to be smuggled
into the United States, via a handful of other countries, at the age of eighteen.  Fen
currently attends a church in New York City, where he was baptized in April 2007.
3The IJ denied Fen’s application, finding that Fen failed to support his testimony
with needed corroborating evidence, including from individuals in China and his church
in New York.  The BIA agreed and dismissed Fen’s appeal, finding no clear error in the
IJ’s findings of fact as well as insufficient evidence to support the asylum claim.  The
BIA noted that Fen failed to provide corroborating evidence to support the crux of his
claim, including evidence of his membership in the unregistered church and his
participation in the church in New York.  An unsworn letter purportedly from Fen’s
mother was deemed insufficient.  The BIA further held that it was reasonable to expect
Fen to produce corroborating evidence, and that his explanations for failing to do so were
unavailing.  The BIA added that Fen’s alleged fear of future persecution is undermined by
the fact that his parents and brother, all Christians, continue to reside safely in China. 
The BIA also rejected the claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief. 
Fen timely filed a petition for review in this Court.  We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a).  “Where, as here, the BIA issues a decision on the merits and not
simply a summary affirmance, we review the BIA’s, and not the IJ’s, decision.” 
Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  “The BIA’s determination will
not be disturbed unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.”  Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
Fen’s principal contention on appeal appears to be that the BIA erred because it
never expressly rejected the credibility of his testimony, and therefore it unreasonably
4required corroboration to support his claim.  We find no merit in this contention.  The
BIA observed that the IJ had “questioned [Fen]’s credibility, [but] did not make an
explicit adverse credibility finding.”  But “notwithstanding doubts about [Fen]’s
credibility,” the BIA rejected Fen’s claim solely on the ground that he had failed to
sustain his burden of proof by not providing sufficient corroborating evidence.
We have held that “[a]n alien’s testimony, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain
the burden of proof without corroboration.”  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 213 (3d
Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).  But it by no means follows that credible testimony
never requires corroborating evidence.  See, e.g., Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252
(3d Cir. 2009) (“[C]redible testimony alone is not always sufficient to meet the burden of
proof.”).
The REAL ID Act of 2005, which the BIA correctly noted is applicable here given
that Fen filed his application after May 11, 2005, expressly provides that “[t]he testimony
of the applicant may be sufficient ... without corroboration, but only if the applicant
satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers
to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”  8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphases added).  Further, “[w]here the trier of fact determines that
the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony,
such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and
 As the government notes in its brief, § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) essentially codifies the1
standard for corroboration that the BIA had adopted in Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I & N Dec.
722 (BIA 1997).  The S-M-J- rule requires a three-part inquiry:  (1) an identification of
the facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) an inquiry as to whether
the applicant has provided information corroborating the relevant facts; and, if he or she
has not, (3) an analysis of whether the applicant has adequately explained his or her
failure to do so.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
the S-M-J- rule is not per se invalid and therefore “the BIA may sometimes require
otherwise-credible applicants to supply corroborating evidence in order to meet their
burden of proof”). 
5
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”  Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).   Additionally, with1
respect to judicial review of a finding as to the availability of corroborating evidence,
“[n]o court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the
availability of corroborating evidence, as described in section 1158(b)(1)(B) ... unless the
court finds ... that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such
corroborating evidence is unavailable.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
The BIA concluded that Fen’s testimony alone, even if credible, was insufficiently
persuasive to establish refugee status.  The BIA thus held that it was appropriate to expect
Fen to corroborate the “critical elements of his claim,” including membership in the
unregistered church and participation in the New York church.  But as the IJ observed,
Fen failed to submit an affidavit from his pastor or from church members in China, or
indeed any evidence (other than an unsworn letter from his mother) to substantiate his
alleged underground church activities and arrests.  Fen also provided no affidavit or
evidence from his New York pastor, who is also from Fujian Province and could be
6expected to support Fen’s story in some manner and verify Fen’s current church activities. 
Fen also provided no evidence from any fellow church member in New York. 
“It is reasonable to expect corroboration where the facts are central to the
applicant’s claim and easily subject to verification.”  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d
185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007).  Fen’s church-related activities are at the heart of his claim.  Fen
testified that he had no evidence from his New York pastor because the pastor was
“busy,” and that fellow church members would not want to get involved in his asylum
case due to the “sensitive issues.”  The BIA did not err in rejecting of these explanations. 
Fen testified vaguely about his knowledge of Christianity, provided inadequate
documentary evidence of his activities in China, and other than submitting a photograph
of his baptism, failed to corroborate his church affiliation.  Substantial evidence supports
the BIA’s finding that Fen failed to sustain his burden of proof. 
Because Fen failed to meet his burden of proof on asylum, the BIA did not err in
holding that he necessarily failed to meet the higher standard required for withholding of
removal.  See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2008).  Fen
also argues, in conclusory fashion, that he will be subjected to torture if returned to China,
but he points to nothing specific in the record, and we have found no evidence, to suggest
that the BIA erred in denying his claim for CAT relief. 
For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
